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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE
LARSON, AND SYSTEMATIC
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 900411-CA
V.
(Category 16)
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LAON, a
Utah corporation, LINDA D.
MILNE, and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS IN REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES
LINDA D. MILNE AND WESTERN SURETY COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants adopt the Statement of the Case section
of their opening brief supplemented as follows:
Appellees1 (Milne and Western Surety Company)
motion for summary judgment is based upon their assertion
that "[t]he undisputed facts establish as a matter of law
that no action or conduct of defendant Milne caused the
plaintiffs the injuries that they allegedly suffered."
(R. 573). The basis for appellees1 conclusion, as stated
in their memorandum of points and authorities, is that
[pllaintiffs1 only claim against defendant
Milne is that she notarized the trust deed
without
observing their signing of the
documents,
and that this notarization
caused them to lose their property.
The

undisputed facts however establish as a
matter of law that defendant Milne's
conduct did not cause plaintiffs to
lose their property,
since Overland
had the right or power to foreclosure
regardless of
whether the trust deed
was notarized.
A notarization is not required to make
a trust deed on real property enforceable. See Utah Code 57-1-6. The reason
that real estate contracts are notarized
is to permit them to be recorded.
See
Utah Code 7-3-1 et seq.
Recording is
not
required to make real estate contracts enforceable between the parties
but only
to permit recording thereby
protecting
the beneficiary of the contract from subsequent purchasers. (Citations omitted)
Thus notarization or
recording
of
the documents is not a
condition precedent to enforcement.
Whatever
the
theory of plaintiffs'
claims
against
defendant
Milne,
plaintiffs cannot recover from defendant
Milne unless they can prove that Milne's
notarization of the trust deed caused
the plaintiff's to lose their property
through foreclosure.
(emphasis added)
This, they cannot prove. Milne's notarization did not give Overland the right
or power to foreclose and therefore did
not cause the plaintiffs to lose their
property.
On default. Overland, pursuant to trust
deed, had the right to foreclose on the
plaintiffs' property whether or not the
trust deed was notarized or recorded.
The notary did not give Overland any
right that it did not have from the
documents themselves absent the notary.
Milne's conduct in placing the notarization on these documents did not cause
plaintiffs to lose their property since
even without the notary Overland would
have had the right to foreclose the
property.
(R. 582-83)
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In Novemberf 1984, defendant Milne was employed
by PFC. (R. 61)
PFC is Overland1s assignor. (R. 108)
Plaintiff Dale L. Larson did not sign the trust
deed. (R. 14, 118)
On November 20, 1984, plaintiff Grethe Larson
signed her own name and plaintiff Dale L. Larson's name
to the trust deed.

(fl 12, R. 580)

Neither Dale nor

Grethe ever acknowledged execution of the trust deed
before defendant Milne. (R. 225)
Defendant Milne, a notary public, acknowledged the
trust deed as follows,
(Notary
Seal)

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On this 20th day of November, 1984
personally appeared before me DALE
L. LARSON AND GRETHE LARSON the
signer(s) of the above instrument
who duly acknowledged to [] that
they executed the same.

(R. 103)

My Commission expires:
April 6, 1987
/s/Linda D. Milne
Notary Public
Residing at;Sandy, Utah

Early on in these proceedings (May, 1987) Milne's
sworn statement or affidavit, of and concerning the
trust deed and the circumstances of its purported
execution, contained the following allegations,
5. In the course of negotiating the
proposed lease, Overland indicated
that it would not
purchase
the
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proposed lease unless additional
security for the transaction was
available.
6. In response to Overland1s requirement/ Larson agreed to put
a second trust deed on his home
in favor of Overland which would
be collateral security for the
payment of the lease.
7. After all the lease documents
had been prepared/ I took the
lease. Trust Deed and
other
1
documents to the Larsons
home
for signature. All of the documents/ including the Trust Deed/
were signed by Larson and
his
wifef
Grethel [sic]
Larson
(hereinafter "Mrs. Larson")/ in
my presence. I then notarized
the documents requiring a notary,
and caused the documents
to be
delivered to Overland.
8. PFC was subsequently informed
that Overland had
Learned
a
second trust deed existed on the
Larson home and would need to
be removed before finalizing the
Lease and that new documents
would need to be signed because
of this.
9. When new documents were prepared/ I again went to
the
Larsons' home, this time with
Ray Welling
(hereinafter
"Welling")/ another employee of
PFC.
At the Larsons1 home/
Welling and I met with Mrs.
Larson in the kitchen.
10. Welling and I explained the
provisions of the documents to
Mrs. Larson
and answered her
questions. At no time, howeverf
did Welling or I promise
or
represent to Mrs. Larson that
the Trust Deed would be released before the lease had been
paid in full.
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11. Mrs. Larson then signed
Trust Deed in my presence.

the

12. Mrs. Larson then informed me
that Larson was in a shop building located behind their home.
13. Mrs. Larson then went to the
shop building in order to obtain
the signature of Larson on the
documents. Soon thereafter,
I
followed
Mrs. Larson
to the
shop.
We found Larson in the
shop building where he exhibited
to me the equipment which was
the subject of the lease, which
was then in operation.
14. I
commented to Larson that
he must
have a lot of faith in
his son-in-law to put his home
on
the line for the business
venture.
Larson indicated that
he did and was very supportive
of Lucking and the new business
venture which would be
engaged
in by the use of the leased
equipment,
and stated several
times
his
enthusiasm
and
confidence for both Lucking and
the new business venture.
15.
As
I
entered the shop,
Larson was signing the necessary
documents.
When Larson signed
the lease documents, he placed
the documents on
top of or at
the
side
of the machine and
signed them while standing over
or next to the machine. The
machine
was
operating while
Larson signed the documents and
I
observed
that the machine
vibrated
whle in operation.
Larson then handed the documents
to me.
16.
Mrs. Larson and I then
returned to the home and Welling
and I departed.
(R. 62-65)
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If the facts and inferrences are analyzed in
the light most favorably to plaintiffs, in the matter
of obtaining the proper execution of the trust deed by
Larsons, PFC, through its employees Welling and Milne,
was Overland's agent.
In their fincil complaint, plaintiffs allege,
On or about November 20, 1984
while acting
as such notary
public, and as agent for
said
P.F.C. and defendant
Overland,
defendant Milne, with a purpose
to cheat and defraud plaintiffs
Larson of their said real property, notarized said trust deeds
which were then entitled to be
and were
recorded in the Salt
Lake
County recorder's office.
In their fincil complaint, plaintiffs include
their claim for fees incurred in litigation against
defendant Overland to undo the problems caused by Milne's
false and fraudulent notarization and subsequent recordation

of the trust deed in

clouding plaintiffs' title,

and for damages for plaintiffs' mental anguish resulting
therefrom. (R. 398-99)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In their motion for summary judgment appellees
Milne and Western Surety Company,
1) failed to demonstrate that there is no
genuine issues as to any material fact, and
2) failed to make a showing which precludes
as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief
to plaintiffs.
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ARGUMENT
1)

Appellees1 summary judgment motion is pre-

mised on their erroneous supposition that plaintiffs1
claim against Milne rests soly on, in appellees1
words (ante., page 2), [plaintiffs1 ability to] "prove
that Milne's notarization caused the plaintiff's [sic]
to lose their property through foreclosure." (R. 582)
As a matter of fact, plaintiffs' claim has never been
that they lost their property at all.

Their claim is

that the trustee's sale is invalid because the underlying trust deed 1) was obtained by fraud, 2) was not
executed by Dale, and 3) nothing is due under the trust
deed because the equipment lease it secures is in fact
a security agreement and there was no commercially
reasonable disposition after repossession so that a
deficiency is barred, and the liquidated damages provision in the lease is unenforceable as a penalty or
forfeiture.

There is no independent basis apart from

the lease to establish an obligation under the trust deed.
A notary who knowingly purports to authenticate
a document which, in fact has not been properly
authenticated, to the detrimental reliance of innocent
third parties, is liable for fraud.

58 AmJur2d Notaries

Public § 64, p. 559.
Milne knew that by acknowledging the trust deed
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she was telling the world that plaintiffs had appeared
before her and affixed their signatures in her presence,
and she thus committed fraud in that she purportedly
let third parties rely on the trust deed she notarized.
Summers Bros., Inc. v. Brewer, 420 So.2d 197 (La.App.
1982); 44 ALR 3rd 1243
The existence of fraud is a question of fact
for the fact finder.

Chamberlain Livestock Auction v.

Penner, 462 N.W.2d 479 (S.D. 1990).
In Vikers v. Shepard, 526 So.2d 1016 (Fla.App.
1988)f the Floria appellate court reiterated that
...fraud is not ordinarily a suitable
subject for summary judgment. (Citation
omitted)
It is a subtle thing requiring a full explanation of the facts and
circumstances of the alleged wrong to
determine if they collectively constitute a fraud, (citation omitted)
A genuine issue of material fact exists
as to
[plaintiffs1] allegations of
fraudulent
conduct on the part of
[Milne]f thereby precluding
summary
judgment.
2)

Plaintiffs1 claims against Milne include

their claim for damages for falsely and fraudulently
exercising her notarial duties which involved plaintiffs
in litigation with Overland or placed them in such a
relation with Overland which made it necessary to incur
expense to protect their interest in the real property
for which they may recover reasonable expenses of such
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litigation, including attorney fees.

South Sanpitch

Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988); National
Wrecking Co. v. Coleman, 487 N.E.2d 1164 (111.App. 1
Dist. 1985).

In South Sanpitch, the Utah Court of

Appeals noted that "Nothing in this opinion should be
taken to mean that damages in cases like these are
limited to attorney fees. . . . " (p. 1282, fn. 5)
Apellees1 summary judgment showing did not preclude,
as a matter of law

plaintiffs1 claim for attorney fees

based on the "third-party tort rule" mentioned in South
Sanpitch.

Their motion was therefore insufficient as a

matter of law.

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Letherby Ins. Co.

594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979).
In part, the factual basis for plaintiffs1 claim
against Milne is that her false notarization

of the

trust deed entitled the same to be recorded and such
recording caused plaintiffs' title to be encumbered.
Litigation expenses were incurred by plaintiffs as a
result of having to vindicate their title.

Implicit

in appellees' argument (ante., 1 and 2) that nothing
Milne did caused plaintiffs to lose their property and
that Overland had the right to foreclose notwithstanding Milne "notarized the trust deed without observing
[plaintiffs] signing the documents.", is appellees'
belief or contention that Grethe signing Dale's name
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to the trust deed effectively encumbered his interest.
(At fn. 5, of appellees1 motion [R. 580] appellees state
"Dale Larson admits that his wife often signed documents for him.

Dale Larson Deposition at 40.")

The

trust deed executed as this one was only operated to
encumber Grethe's interest.

Belnap v. Walker Bank &

Trust Co., 627 P.2d 47 (Utah 1981); Texas American Bank/
Levelland v. Morgan, 733 P.2d 874 (N.M. 1978); Handy v.
Shiells, 235 Cal.Rptr. 543 (Cal.App.lDist.1987). Grethe
could not bind Dale to the trust deed.

Carbine v. Meyer,

126 Cal.2d 386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954), and there is no
husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. Williams
v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
power of attorney would suffice.

Only a written

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d

149 (Utah 1983) .
CONCLUSION
Appellees' summary judgment motion

was

insufficient in law in its failure to show conclusively the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Gaw v. State of
Utah, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 [1990]), and in its failure to
preclude, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to
plaintiffs, and was improperly granted.
DATED January 14, 1991.
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